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Developing Maritime Digital Competencies
Rory Hopcraft
Abstract—In recent years there has been a relentless drive
by all industries to digitalize many of the everyday operations.
The maritime industry is no exception, with the increase in
digital tools that assist the everyday operations of the seafarer.
What is more, much of this technology is now networked
together, or to the internet, which opens the seafarer up to a
wave of new cyber risks. Maritime communication systems have
often been demonstrated as insecure in the recent past. Thus,
without appropriate training, seafarers are ill-prepared to protect
themselves, and the systems they are responsible for, from the
impacts of a cyber incident. This article will argue that there is
a clear link between seafarer training and maritime safety. As
such, there is a need to develop standardized digital competencies
for all seafarers. The creation of these competencies needs to be
considerate of the company-specific and operation-specific risk
management practices. This article presents one possible solution
for the development of maritime digital competencies utilizing the
well-established NIST Cybersecurity Framework.
Index Terms—Maritime, Cybersecurity, seafarer, competencies
I. INTRODUCTION
IN recent years there has been a rapid increase in the numberof digital technologies integrated into ship systems. This
technology now forms vast networks, often connecting to the
internet, increasing the reliance upon, and vulnerabilities to,
maritime communication systems. For example, compromising
the satellite communication that underpins both navigation and
the Global Maritime Distress Safety System (GMDSS) puts
seafarer safety at risk. With an estimated 90 percent of all
goods being shipped via the world’s oceans [1], providing
seafarers with adequate cybersecurity training is vital to ensure
the continued safety and security of these vital communication
networks.
Ship communication systems have come under increased
scrutiny from researchers, proving that some of these systems
are vulnerable to cyber attack [2]. While attempting to fool
remote-guided weaponry, the Russian government has been
demonstrating these vulnerabilities since the early 2000s. More
recently in 2019, an escalation of tensions in the Straits of
Hormuz led to the accusation that Iran was subtly manipulating
GPS to trick ships into entering Iranian territorial waters,
allowing their detention [3]. The manipulation of GPS signals
leads to a ship’s navigational equipment presenting an inac-
curate location, raising serious safety concerns for seafarers
on-board.
It is worth noting that other cyber risks threaten the safety
and security of ship systems. For instance, ships have long
lifespans, leading to systems remaining in service long after
becoming obsolete. These unsupported systems do not benefit
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from regular security updates, leaving them increasingly vul-
nerable until the end of the ship’s life cycle. Furthermore, out-
of-date systems also pose a threat to modern ships, where, due
to limited bandwidth at sea, a ship has to wait until its next port
call to download patches and updates. Thus, due to the varied
nature of cyber risks, effective risk management should include
a combination of different mitigations, including technical,
physical, and procedural mitigations.
This article will argue that seafarers, as the operators of
these systems, play a vital role in ensuring the continued
safety and security of their ship. Thus, as part of their cyber
risk management, companies should develop digital compe-
tencies alongside other mitigations. Equipping seafarers with
appropriate digital competencies will ensure they are not only
aware of the risks facing their digital systems, but are also
better prepared to respond to those risks. Furthermore, these
competencies are considerate of the complexities inherent in
maritime operations. These complexities include the diverse
backgrounds and experiences of seafarers, as well as the
challenges in providing training to crews who spend little time
in ports.
In 2017, facing growing pressure the International Maritime
Organization (IMO) issued Resolution MSC.428(98) – Mar-
itime Cyber Risk Management in Safety Management Systems
[4] as its first step towards regulating maritime cybersecurity.
Using this Resolution, and its other instruments, the IMO has
placed significant emphasis on the development of seafarers’
digital skills as an important risk management strategy. By
analyzing the current regulatory requirements, and discussing
how these imply the need to develop digital competencies, the
first section of this article will explore the deep-rooted link
between maritime safety, security, and training. The second
section will present a framework that allows the development
of standardized digital competencies that are considerate of the
ship’s wider risk management approach. Finally, the article
will conclude by discussing some of the current and future
challenges facing the standardization of digital competencies.
II. MARITIME SAFETY, SEAFARER COMPETENCIES, AND
TRAINING
The IMO, like other regulatory bodies, provide a clear
distinction between safety and security. Whereby, safety means
the protection from the risk of injury, in the context of non-
intentional events, like accidents, whereas security refers to
protection from intentional events [5]. However, the Interna-
tional Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) argues that managing
safety and security often occurs synchronously [6]. Thus,
companies will deal with the consequences of an incident sim-
ilarly regardless of intentionality. For instance, during a power
failure on-board, regardless of the cause, the crew will respond
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the same way by ensuring the event does not compromise the
ship’s safety or security (i.e. drift into the path of another ship).
Therefore, in regards to cyber risk management, crews need to
interact with and respond to events involving digital systems
appropriately. This ensures that seafarer actions do not cause
a safety incident, or inadvertently aid a security event. Thus,
as the actions of seafarers have a direct impact on the safety
and security of a ship’s systems, they must be equipped with
appropriate digital competencies to make informed decisions
about those systems.
The IMO has long since emphasized the link between the
human element and the safety and security of the maritime
sector. In 1993 the IMO formally acknowledged the relation-
ship between training and ship safety [7]. Developing this
further, the IMO argues safety and security are based upon
many complex interacting variables, which include training,
skill, and experience [8]. Thus, as the reliance on digital
systems increases, so too should the skill and experience
levels of seafarers. A recent survey by the shipping association
BIMCO found that 52% of respondents felt that their personnel
were their organization’s biggest cyber vulnerability [9]. The
survey also reports that phishing and spear-phishing were the
two most common attack vectors, with 68 and 41 percent
respectively experiencing these types of attacks in 2020. Thus,
as the seafarer increasingly finds themselves, and their systems
facing cyber risks, they must be equipped with the skills to
ensure they do not compromise the safety and security of the
ship.
A. The IMO, STCW Convention, and Digital Competencies
As the United Nations specialized agency charged with the
safety and security of international shipping, the IMO has led
the way in standardizing maritime skills and practices with
the aim to improve the operational safety of the industry.
This standardization comes in the form of the International
Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watch-
keeping (STCW) [10]. The STCW Convention argues that the
safety and security of a ship are reliant upon seafarers who are
qualified and fit for duties. The Convention stipulates the core
competencies that all seafarers must demonstrate in order to
make a knowledgeable and informed contribution to the safe
operation of the ship.
STCW also obligates companies to tailor the development
of competencies towards the specific needs of the ship, and
its operations (e.g. LPG tanker, cruise ship, container ship,
etc). Companies are also required to provide a reasonable
opportunity for the crew to become familiar with shipboard
equipment and operating procedures needed for the proper
performance of their duties. Without this familiarization or
training, crews will be ill-prepared for operating shipboard
systems, increasing the risk they pose to the safety and security
of both ship and crew.
Another IMO instrument that provides guidance on seafarer
competencies is the International Management Code for the
Safe Operations of Ships and for Pollution Prevention (ISM
Code). The Code stipulates that “the Company should establish
and maintain procedures for identifying any training which
may be required in support of the SMS [Safety Management
System] and ensure that such training is provided for all
personnel concerned” [11]. The SMS should contain instruc-
tions and procedures that ensures the safe operation of the
ship during normal and emergency operations. Therefore,
the company who are responsible for the operation of the
ship, and managing its’ crew, must now consider the skills
and knowledge required by their seafarers to implement the
procedures within the SMS.
Therefore, under the current IMO instruments, there is
scope to include digital competencies as part of cyber risk
management. With the continued integration of digital systems
onto ships, all seafarers now have a duty to ensure they
do not compromise the safety or security of these systems.
What is more, due to their ability to understand the risks
specific to their operations, these regulations place the onus
of training on the company. Thus, to fulfill their requirements
under STCW, companies should consider the difference in
operations, operational environments, vessel types, and the
pre-existing digital skills of seafarers when developing digital
competencies for their crews.
B. Safety Risk Management and Training
As mentioned previously safety and security often have a
differing focus, yet as companies strive to improve either, they
inadvertently advance the other. The IAEA and IMO have both
advocated for the synchronous development of both a safety
and a security culture that encourages the holistic management
of risk [6]. As such, the IMO argues that a safety culture forms
an integral part of a company’s safety management system
(SMS). The IMO also argues that this should also include the
development of a just culture [12], where companies accept
that accidents do happen, and these offer an opportunity to
learn what changes are needed to address failings in the current
SMS.
The development of an organizational culture that is con-
siderate of both safety and security, as illustrated in Fig. 1,
allows a company to assess the risks they face, and determine
the activities required to mitigate that risk. Therefore, with
Resolution MSC.428(98) placing cyber risk under the provi-
sions of the ISM Code, companies must now consider it within
their SMS and develop their safety cultures to include cyber
risk.
In Akshaikh’s review of cybersecurity culture initiatives
[13], it is evident that human actions and behaviors play a vital
role in the development of organizational cultures that consider
cyber risk. Thus, the development of a cyber-inclusive safety
management system will ensure an organization understands
the cyber risk management skills that are required by a
ship’s crew. For example, what skills would be required to
ensure, and maintain, the safe working practices and working
environment of digital systems? (i.e. recognize false sensor
data). Secondly, what skills would the crew require if having
to implement emergency procedures due to a cyber incident?
(i.e. rebooting a critical system).
What is more, as part of a ship’s SMS, companies are
obligated to identify equipment and technical systems that the
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sudden operational failure of which, may result in hazardous
situations. Therefore, companies should be providing seafarers
with the appropriate digital skills to ensure they can manage
the risk posed by a compromised system. The loss of these
systems may be accidental or deliberate, but by acquiring these
digital skills, seafarers will be more able to recognize the
change in system circumstances. Thus, reducing the likelihood
that a ship enters a hazardous situation, and if it does, they
will be better equipped to reduce the impacts of the situation.
For example, the ability to safely navigate a ship manually in
the event of the loss of digital navigational equipment.
C. Current Requirements for Digital Competencies
The previous section illustrates, that while IMO instru-
ments advocate the development of digital competencies, they
contain no explicit guidance as to what this process looks
like. However, pursuant to the entry into force of Resolu-
tion.428(98) the US Coast Guard have issued a Work Instruc-
tion discussing how a ship’s cyber risk management will be as-
sessed during a routine inspection [15]. The Instruction argues
that if under questioning, seafarers are unable to demonstrate
a general understanding of cyber risk management, it will
constitute a failure of the SMS. Failure will lead to the
ship being detained having both financial, and reputational
repercussions for the operator. It is also conceivable that if a
cyber-incident were to occur because of a lack of digital skills,
a company can no longer claim ignorance when addressing
cyber risk [16]. Thus, reiterating that seafarers must understand
the cyber risks they face, and have the appropriate skills
required to implement risk management processes.
While the IMO is charged with ensuring the continued
safety and security of the maritime sector it directs its’ mem-
bers to other stakeholders for guidance. One such example
is the International Organization for Standardization (ISO),
who themselves reiterate the importance of developing digital
competencies in cyber risk management. Firstly, if a company
were to engage in a comprehensive risk management program,
they may wish to consider ISO31000:2009 - Risk Manage-
ment - Principles and Guidelines [17]. If used appropriately,
ISO31000 could provide a standardized framework to incor-
porate cyber risk into a ship’s risk management practices. The
Standard reiterates the importance of implementing adequate
training sessions, and programs to ensure employees are able
to adhere to risk management strategies.
Moreover, endorsed by the IMO’s cyber risk man-
agement guidelines, companies should be considering
ISO/IEC27001:2013 - Information Technology - Security Tech-
niques [18] to inform their cyber risk management practices.
The Standard asserts that all employees shall receive ap-
propriate awareness, education, and training on information
security, relevant to their job function. Again, this highlights
the importance that each seafarer receives the appropriate
digital skills allowing them to operate safely.
None of the mentioned documents provide a definitive list
of digital competencies required by seafarers. However, they
do illustrate the link between cyber risk management and the
development of digital competencies. Without clear guidance
from the IMO on these competencies, companies have to
ensure they are developing a safety culture that takes into
consideration company-specific cyber risks. Developing this
culture will ensure that the company is equipping its seafarers
with the right skills to implement the SMS.
III. DEVELOPING STANDARDIZED CYBERSECURITY
COMPETENCIES
As discussed earlier, due to differences in ships and their op-
erations, each system creates a unique network of interactions.
This means that companies should be equipping their crews
with appropriate knowledge and skills to ensure the continued
safety and security that is specific to that ship. The IMO,
through the technical competencies contained within STCW,
has demonstrated its ability to create generic standardized
training requirements applicable to all ships. It is then the
company’s responsibility to deliver this training, addressing
both the common operational elements (for example fire
safety) and the ship/operational specific elements (for example
passenger evacuation). Thus, ensuring all seafarers achieve a
minimum standard of competencies that address these opera-
tional differences throughout the sector.
Other regulatory bodies, including US Federal Aviation
Administration, have mandated the delivery of standardized
information security training [19]. These policies argue that
educating, and upskilling personnel who interact with digital
systems will help to reduce the risk they pose to safety and
security. Therefore, the maritime sector should look towards
standardizing digital competencies to ensure the continued
safety and security of operations, especially as more digiti-
zation is coming in the form of autonomous ships or Internet
of Things devices.
The IMO has started this process through the release of
Circular MSC-FAL.1/Circ.3 [20], which draws a direct link
between cyber risk management and crew awareness. The
Circular asserts that effective cyber risk management should
ensure an appropriate level of awareness of cyber risks at all
levels of an organization. The level of awareness and prepared-
ness should be appropriate to roles and responsibilities in the
cyber risk management system.
As with the discussion above, other IMO instruments pro-
vide insight into what these different roles and responsibilities
are. The levels of assumed responsibility presented by the
STCW Convention best illustrate these differences as a hier-
archy, where each level has more responsibility for the safety
and security of the ship. These levels are Management level,
Operational Level, and Support level. The Management level
encompasses the Master, chief engineer, etc. The Operational
level includes the officers, and the Support level is all other
seafarers.
Each level of assumed responsibility requires the demonstra-
tion of a different set of competencies, which are proportional
to the seafarer’s overall responsibility on-board. Furthermore,
the STCW lays out the competencies with a hierarchical
nature. Thus, as a seafarer assumes a higher level of re-
sponsibility they must demonstrate all required competencies
from the lower tier. One such example of the additional
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Fig. 1. Development of a Safety and Security Culture - Adapted from [14]
responsibility is the discretion of the Master, as discussed in
various IMO instruments. Having this discretion means that no
other person shall prevent, or restrict, the ship from executing
any decision that the Master deems is necessary for the safety
or security of the ship. Thus, illustrating that while all crew
must demonstrate broad competencies to ensure a ship’s safety
and security, the Master must have the appropriate knowledge
to fulfill the additional requirements of being in a higher
position of responsibility. For example, being able to advise
and direct others to the best course of action (see Figure.2).
Determining that the Master requires more cybersecurity
training than a deckhand is only part of the puzzle. As
discussed above, the IMO is yet to provide clear guidance on
the required digital competencies of seafarers. However, inspi-
ration can be drawn from the NIST Cybersecurity Framework
[21]. The IMO recommends the NIST framework as a guide
on the implementation of cyber risk management practices. As
such, the framework provides a methodology through which
companies can identify critical assets and systems, the threats
to those systems, and the required mitigation processes.
As with all socio-technical systems, the human element is
just one of the factors that influence a company’s cyber risk
management approach. Applying the NIST framework ensures
companies are considering cyber risk holistically, from both
a safety and security perspective. Thus, allowing companies
to understand the role of their seafarers within the SMS, and
implement other physical, technical, or procedural mitigations,
that compliments this. This process will also highlight where
competencies need developing to ensure seafarers are not
only able to interact with risk management measures but
also recognize when these measures have failed. Through this
understanding, companies can provide the right competencies
to seafarers, allowing them to implement appropriate responses
to safety or security incidents.
The application of the five core functions of NIST (Identify,
Protect, Detect, Respond and Recover) to the hierarchy of
responsibility, could provide a framework for organizations to
understand what competencies are required by crew to fulfill
their role within the core functions (see Figure.3). Illustrating
that at each advancing tier an individual should be able to
perform the core functions to a higher degree.
• Support Level - At this level, competencies would in-
clude a high-level basic awareness style of understanding.
Often categorized as cyber hygiene, this awareness would
include a basic understanding of their responsibilities.
Alongside this, these seafarers would have the skills
required to exercise basic cyber risk management prac-
tices, include the ability to identify phishing emails, good
password practices, and personal device etiquette. As per
[15], this is the level of knowledge that all crewmembers
must demonstrate at inspection.
• Operational Level - At this level, seafarers should be
able to implement appropriately the awareness gained at
the Support level. Furthermore, the crew should have a
detailed understanding of the systems within their area of
responsibility (navigational equipment or engine control,
etc). Training would provide an understanding of system
interactions, and the risk posed to these systems, as
well as safeguards, recovery measures, and redundancies.
Crew competencies should also include the ability to
autonomously recognize the occurrence of a cyber in-
cident within their domain of responsibility, and provide
recommendations to senior crew on its mitigation.
• Management Level - These competencies would provide
seafarers with a detailed ship-wide understanding of the
ship’s systems, and their interactions. This knowledge
would provide a detailed level of understanding that
would allow personnel to identify, and priorities ship-
wide risks and safeguards in the event of a cyber incident.
This comprehensive understanding placed the Master in
a unique position on-board. The Master is best able to
disseminate information about the specific risks to the
ship’s system, and its operations to other crew, espe-
cially junior personnel. Thus, at a management level,
the seafarer should attain the ability to disseminate, and
discuss, cyber risk management practices competently to
others, including other crewmembers, third-party service
providers, or other business personnel.
Fig. 4 demonstrates the escalating competencies of higher
levels of assumed responsibility when aligned to the NIST
core functions. Approaching digital competencies through this
framework ensures their development remains complementary
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Fig. 2. Type of Knowledge vs Amount and breadth of Knowledge
Fig. 3. NIST Framework with the STCW hierarchy overlaid
to other risk management processes and mitigations, rather
than being an afterthought. What is more, as each ship,
crew, and company is different this framework allows them
to develop holistic competencies to the individual needs of
the ship, its crew, and its operations.
However, this approach is flawed, as the divide between
the assumed levels of responsibility is too neat. To align
with the development of a safety culture, organizations should
be providing opportunities for those seafarers at lower levels
of responsibility to engage further with digital competencies.
To this end, the STCW Convention actively encourages all
seafarers to request any training that they consider appropriate
to their job role. Thus, to ensure the development of a resilient
safety culture that addresses the constantly changing cyber
risk landscape, companies should encourage all crew to be
actively striving for a more knowledgeable work environment.
Thus, allowing seafarers to make better-informed decisions
that actively contribute to the continued safe operation of a
ship.
Furthermore, while the application of the NIST framework
allows companies to recognize the skills their seafarers re-
quire, it does little to address the diversity found within the
workforce. Due to the nature of the maritime sector, seafarers
have a diverse range of social and cultural backgrounds and
will often move between ships. Ensuring this workforce has
the appropriate digital skills is challenging, especially consid-
ering the following factors: 1) the varying levels of digital
integration found on ships, 2) crews’ preconceived notions of
cyber risk management, and 3) the diversity in pre-existing
technological experiences. However, a company implementing
a detailed SMS utilizing the NIST framework will ensure
a minimum level of digital competency for their seafarers.
The SMS would also recognize the need for an appropriate
familiarization period as well as the need for other mitigation
measures. Altogether, this would reduce the overall impact of
workforce diversity.
IV. FUTURE CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES
As with all industries, there is a constant proverbial game
of catchup between technology and digital skills. The rapidly
changing cybersecurity landscape means seafarers are con-
stantly facing new challenges to their everyday operations,
and as such require the skills to manage these. This article
has argued that cybersecurity and the digital competencies
that underpin it are specific to companies, crews, and ship
operations.
As discussed above, the IMO has been able to produce a
set of standardized competencies that ensure the operation-
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Fig. 4. Demonstration of escalating competencies related to the NIST core functions
specific risk management requirements are addressed. Thus,
at a regulatory level, to ensure that companies are considering
digital competencies as part of their cyber risk management
practices, a new requirement in the STCW Convention could
be included. This requirement would mandate a minimum
level of digital competencies for all levels of responsibility.
This would include being able to: 1) Understand basic cyberse-
curity concepts (Identify), 2) Follow procedures to use systems
in a safe and secure way (Protect), 3) Recognize a potential
cybersecurity incident (Detect), 4) Know the procedures to
follow in response to a cybersecurity incident (Respond), and
5) Take part in cybersecurity emergency and contingency
procedures (Recover). Thus, allowing organizations to deter-
mine what is appropriate to each level of responsibility within
their operations, whilst ensuring a minimum level of digital
competency across the sector.
Aside from the challenge of mandating standardized digital
competencies, there are several challenges that the develop-
ment of digital competencies must overcome:
• Training delivery - Due to the nature of maritime oper-
ations, the opportunities to provide training to seafarers
are limited. Academy training offers the first opportu-
nity to provide some digital competencies, like many
other STCW competencies. However, as discussed, one-
off training is not adequate, and companies must offer
ongoing tailored training. Providing this type of training
also faces challenges, for example, the time frame for
port calls is constantly reducing, giving limited time for
seafarers to engage with face-to-face training. Moreover,
port calls are an opportunity for seafarers to relax and
socialize, so enforcing training during this time could
be unpopular. Other challenges include the international
nature of operations, and technical limitations of vessels
when delivering e-learning.
• Transfer of skills ashore - With increasing system com-
plexity, it is realistic to imagine that a ship’s crew may
no longer have the skills required to maintain, service,
and repair digital systems. Therefore, ships will become
reliant upon external engineers to ensure the continuity
of its’ systems. This transfer may also change the duties
and responsibilities of the crew on-board (e.g. meaning
more monitoring and maintaining of systems) so they will
require the skills to do this. Moreover, these engineers,
whether accessing remotely or physically, will need ap-
propriate training to understand the unique complexities
of a ship’s systems, and operations, to ensure maintenance
is completed safely.
• More than just seafarers - The maritime sector consists
of more than just ships and their crews. The sector
includes ports and other service providers, each with their
own personnel, completing different daily operations.
However, the STCW Convention does not include these
individuals, who play a vital role in maritime cyberse-
curity. As a consequence, the IMO has no ability to
enforce the development of digital competencies for these
individuals. In 2018, the EU ratified the NIS Directive,
which lists ports and other maritime service providers
as essential services. As such, these essential services
must implement digital skill development to ensure the
continued safety of the maritime industry. Therefore, the
maritime sector, using other complementary regulatory
requirements needs to develop digital competencies that
ensure the continued security and safety of the maritime
sector.
• Fully autonomous ships - As the industry continues to
test the viability of autonomous vessels, the competencies
of seafarers overseeing their operation also needs consid-
eration. Traditionally, a ship’s engineer would oversee the
day-to-day maintenance of a ship’s system, attempting to
limp a ship to the closest port for repair. However, with
the removal of personnel on an autonomous ship it raises
important questions. Primarily, what skills do autonomous
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ship operators need to ensure the safety of operations?
Secondly, what skills do engineers need to maintain these
complex systems, and potentially be in a position where
they need to manually sail the ship to port?
While the continued integration of technology into the
maritime industry raises challenges, it also brings with it
opportunities. Firstly, as this article has illustrated, technology
offers the opportunity for a safer and more secure working
environment, leading to fewer maritime incidents. Further-
more, a company focusing on increasing its crew’s digital
skills will facilitate the development and enhancement of the
company’s safety culture. A company with a more mature
safety culture will increase the likelihood that crewmembers
are able to make knowledgeable decisions about systems, even
in emergencies that ensure the continued safety of the crew
and vessel. There are also other benefits to be had from
the integration of technology including increased efficiency
and reduced emissions, both of which contribute to a more
sustainable, and profitable, maritime industry.
Technology also offers greater opportunities to companies
when providing training. With the increase of devices on-board
and stable internet connections, companies can now develop
their training offerings. This could include using emails,
multimedia materials, online courses, or simulation to provide
training that is engaging and has higher retention. What is
more, utilizing the benefits of digital training’s interactive
elements ensures that training can keep pace with the constant
developments and changes in the needs of the crew.
V. CONCLUSION
The maritime sector now faces an inevitable surge in
digitalization, and with the recent amendments to international
regulation, it provides an opportunity to develop seafarers’
digital skills. The process of adapting and amending seafarer
competencies is by no means a quick and simple task. It
will take time to ensure that these competencies match the
intricacies of operations, the complexity of systems, and the
expectations of operators. This article has outlined one way in
which companies can utilize the NIST framework to identify
key competencies that their personnel should acquire. As
discussed, there could become a point in the future where, if
seafarers cannot demonstrate appropriate cyber risk manage-
ment knowledge, safety compliance certificates are withheld.
The article has also argued that the differences between the
different types of maritime operations makes it challenging
to create a set of standardized digital competencies. In the
near future, due to its requirements as the UN agency charged
with ensuring maritime safety, the IMO is expected to include
digital competencies within its regulatory instruments. It is
therefore vital that these inclusions are created through the
collaboration with key stakeholders within the sector. Thus,
ensuring the standardized competencies are considerate of the
variations within maritime operations.
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